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related in the way that I have outlined, is inevitably to conceive that the world will actually has its total expression in the entire time process of deeds, and so of events, past, present, and to come. If an individual right hand glove is real, and if an individual left hand glove is also real, and if they are mates, then the pair of gloves whereof these two mates are the units, is itself real, and so, if the past of the time order is real, and if the future of the time order is real, and if past and future belong together, then the whole of the time order has its own reality as a whole. Since, however, the future time order is not just now temporally and transiently a present datum, but is precisely the totality of future events, and since an analogous proposition holds of the past, the whole time order is real not at any one temporal instant, but precisely as a time-inclusive totality. And that is precisely what I myself mean by an eternal reality. By the eternal I mean not in the least the timeless, but the totality of temporal events viewed precisely as a totality. That such an eternal is real, not at any one instant, but as an eternal, is as sure as that if the fingers of a living hand are real, the whole hand of which these are the fingers is itself a reality. The temporal not merely implies the eternal; in its wholeness it constitutes the eternal,—namely, the total decision of the world will, wherein the loyal will to be rational finds its own fulfillment.

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## THE ETHICS OF PLATO.

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I N attempting within the limits of a short article to give an account of the ethical theory of a writer so voluminous as Plato, I am attempting, as I am well aware, a task of no ordinary difficulty. For the shortcomings in the

execution of it I would crave the indulgence of the critical reader, pleading that I am here writing only as a plain man for plain men.

1. *Fifth-century Ethics.* To understand the genesis of Plato's views we must hark back to the half-century before his work began, the age of the Greek 'Aufklärung,' when Protagoras and Hippias, Gorgias and Socrates were the most prominent forces in the intellectual life of Greece. We must take some account of these predecessors because it is clear that in the wide sweep of Plato's mind all the main streams of pre-Platonic speculation converge to meet. As on the metaphysical side he is the successor of Heraclitus and Parmenides, so on the ethical side he receives his momentum from the Sophists and Socrates. In the hands of the Sophists the old nature-philosophy of the Ionian schools had been transformed into something more like *littera humaniores*; they had given form to the natural suspicion of their age that, after all, "the proper study of mankind" is not any senseless 'element,' but man himself; they, in a word,—the word of Cicero,—had brought down philosophy from heaven to the dwellings and cities of men. Roughly speaking, we may describe the Sophists as professional teachers of social and political 'excellence' (ἀρετή), meaning by 'excellence' not only moral virtue, in the strict sense, but the whole complex of arts and graces which go to make a successful life. In the city-state of that period, one of the conditions most necessary for social and political advancement was rhetorical skill; and accordingly we find that the teaching of rhetoric, the art of plausible speech, was one of the most lucrative branches of the Sophists' trade. As to morals, it does not appear that the Sophists taught on any scientific basis; they did not preach any doctrine of virtue for virtue's sake nor make any attempt to distinguish between principle and self-interest; such an argument as "Honesty is the best policy" represents, it would seem, the high water mark of their ethical theory. With the Sophists was classed by his Athenian judges and executioners

Socrates,—Socrates whom Xenophon pictures as little better than a *bourgeois* moralist. The insight of Plato saw more truly than either Xenophon or the dikasts that the ultimate effect of the Socratic λόγοι was to confound the Sophists and to explode their views; and this veiled significance of the historical Socrates is made clearly explicit in the argumentations of the Platonic Socrates. But though the chief value of the work of Socrates was negative and lay in the sapping destructive criticism he applied to current dogmas, and in the inductive definition-seeking method of inquiry he employed, we have to notice also the positive positions which he laid down, which were these three: “Virtue is a unity”; “Virtue is knowledge”; “Vice is involuntary.”

Having said thus much by way of indicating the atmosphere in which Plato’s views of morality sprung up, it is now time to approach those views more closely.

2. *The Preliminary Dialogues.* Plato’s earlier writings are commonly, and conveniently, divided into two main classes. In the first of these we count dialogues like the *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, in which by the Socratic method of question-and-answer an attempt is made to arrive, in the Socratic manner, at definite notions of moral qualities such as piety, temperance, courage. Inasmuch as the conclusions reached are not of a satisfactory character, it may be said that the positive value of these dialogues,—which are little more than preliminary exercises in elementary dialectic,—consists mainly in the way in which current ethical opinion is convicted of inconsistency and futility. What Socrates had maintained with his dying breath, his disciple here reiterates: the men who talk most glibly on matters of politics and morals are precisely the men who *know* least about them: like people, like priest,—like doxo-sophist, like Demos.

In the second class of Plato’s earlier works we find him coming to closer grips with the errors of the Sophistic schools. Thus the *Gorgias*, the *Euthydemus*, and the *Protagoras* have a definitely controversial tone, Socrates the

true 'Sophist' being pitted against the pseudo-sophists of his own age. A favorite theme of controversy was the question, "Is virtue teachable?"—a question raised in the *Protagoras* and *Meno*. In the former of these, for example, Protagoras is represented as maintaining the teachability of virtue against the doubts of Socrates; and the trend of the argument is to show that the position of Protagoras is only tenable on condition that we admit the truth of the Socratic position, "Virtue is knowledge," an admission which the Sophist naturally is loath to make. It is, then, in the dialogues of this class, or period, that Plato develops most fully his attack on the vulgar conception of morality and on the Sophists who did little more, in Plato's eyes, than act as prophets of popular opinion, formulating and defending the least defensible elements in the vulgar conception. The main points of this attack we must content ourselves with summing up as briefly as possible. In the first place, what went by the name of 'virtue' in the view of the vulgar and their sophistic teachers was something of which they could give no consistent account, the effect of no assignable causes, a product the origin of which they were totally unable to explain. Hence, also, they could never guarantee either to produce it or reproduce it, or to insure its development and its permanence when produced. A virtuous man, on this showing, can be nothing else than a sport of nature, a whim of the gods, called into existence only by the rare fortuitous working of some 'divine dispensation' *θεῖα μοίρα*. Secondly, in the popular view virtue was regarded as a plurality of four or more different qualities,—wisdom, justice, holiness, courage, etc.,—of which no two are alike and yet the mass of them lumped together is to be labeled 'virtue.' In opposition to this Plato sets the Socratic view, "Every virtue is (a form of) wisdom." Further, in respect of its contents, popular morality is seen to be often perverse, inasmuch as it tends to condone certain kinds of evil (such as injuring enemies), and to put the label of virtue on the products of vice. And lastly, the

final end of action, the *summum bonum*, is usually conceived to lie in some material advantage, or some sensual pleasure, as if virtue were no adequate end in itself. These are the main points on which Plato touches in his critique of current ethics; but illuminating though it is in itself, the main value of that critique is to clear the ground for the establishment of the positive doctrine set forth in the *Republic*.

3. *The Developed Theory of Virtue, and Its Psychological Basis.* The ostensible theme of the *Republic*,—in the wide scope of which are included dissertations on religion and art as well as on ethics and politics,—is Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*): justice as a quality both of the state and of the individual. In the course of the search for justice the other virtues are found to emerge first,—namely, wisdom (*σοφία*), courage (*ἀνδρεία*), and temperance (*σωφροσύνη*). Of these, wisdom is seen to be the virtue peculiar to the ruling class in the state, the guardians, and courage to be similarly peculiar to the military class, the auxiliaries. And as in the state so in the individual,—who is assumed to be a ‘micropolis,’—wisdom and courage attach to special divisions of the soul, to the ‘rational’ and ‘spirited’ element respectively. But when we come to the other two virtues, it is less easy to delimit their spheres. This is how Plato describes temperance:

Temperance in its action is not like courage and wisdom. The wisdom and the courage which makes the city wise and courageous reside each in a particular part, but temperance is spread through the whole alike, setting in unison of the octave the weakest and the strongest and the middle class . . . so that we may most justly say that this unanimity is temperance, the concord of the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which should rule in the city or in the individual.<sup>1</sup> . . . We call the individual temperate by reason of the friendship and harmony of these elements, when the ruler and the two subjects are agreed that the rational element must rule and there is no rebellion against him.<sup>2</sup>

Next as to Justice: as exhibited in the state, it is de-

<sup>1</sup> *Republic*, 432 A., Mr. A. D. Lindsay's translation.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 442.

scribed (p. 433) as "the principle abiding in child and woman, in slave and freeman and artisan, in ruler and ruled, that each minded his own business, one man one work, and was not meddlesome." It is also "that virtue in a city which enabled all (the other virtues) to find a place in it, and after they have appeared, preserves them so long as it is present in the city." And as "the city was just by reason of the three classes within it each doing their own work," so "each one of us will be just and doing his own work if the parts within him are doing severally their own work."

The just man does not allow the different principles within him to do other work than their own, nor the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with one another; but in the truest sense sets his house in order, gaining the mastery over himself; and becoming on good terms with himself through discipline, he joins in harmony those different elements like three terms in a musical scale . . . and binding together all these elements he moulds the many within him into one mass, temperate and harmonious.

It is clear from this that Plato's view of virtue as both one and fourfold, a complex unity, is based upon his view of the soul as a trinity in unity, a whole made up of three elements, the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational. It is this advance in psychological analysis which enables him to go beyond the simple Socratic assertion, "Virtue is one." What is not so clear is the precise distinction which he wishes to draw between temperance and justice, both of which are said to apply to the whole range of the soul rather than to any one part of it. Perhaps the distinction intended might be conveyed most simply by means of a short algebraic formula: suppose  $\alpha$  to represent the rational,  $\beta$  the spirited,  $\gamma$  the appetitive element,—then temperance ('self-mastery') implies  $\alpha : \beta :: \beta : \gamma$  or (in the proportion of "the octave") 4 : 2 :: 2 : 1, while justice implies  $\alpha = \alpha$ ,  $\beta = \beta$ ,  $\gamma = \gamma$ . Professor Sidgwick expressed the distinction in these terms: "Temperance or orderliness is related to uprightness as the structure of an organism to its life,—the former expresses the due submission of the non-rational elements to reason, whereas

the latter denotes the harmonious functioning of the duly related elements." Justice is not only a virtue; it is something more than a virtue. To quote Mr. R. L. Nettleship:

Justice in Plato's sense is the power of individual concentration on duty. If a soldier is just in this sense, he is of course a brave man; if a man in a subordinate position is just, he of course accepts and maintains authority, or is 'self-controlled.' Justice therefore, though it has been spoken of as one among other virtues, and though it manifests itself in many particular actions which are called in a specific sense just, and to which the names of the other virtues are not applied, is really the condition of the existence of all the virtues; each of them is a particular manifestation of the spirit of justice, which takes different forms according to a man's function in the community. In modern phrase it is equivalent to a sense of duty.

Similarly Dr. J. Adam (on *Republic* 434 C) writes:

Civic Justice is the soil out of which all the other virtues grow; its fruits are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, of which the last appears in the Farmers and Artisans, the last two in the Auxiliaries, while the Rulers possess all three. Thus all the Virtues meet in Justice, and it is in Justice, not in *σοφία* (as the historical Socrates held), that the true unity of Virtue consists. Plato's Justice is in reality not so much a specific virtue, as Virtue or Righteousness in general.

Here then we have the clue to Plato's treatment of Justice: he seeks to expand and enlarge the notion so that from a specific it may be transformed into a generic notion, indicating Virtue at large rather than a mere fractional quarter of it. This, however, does not mean that *δικαιοσύνη* becomes a synonym of *ἀρετή*, since the latter term covers not only moral virtue but every possible kind of human excellence: what it means is rather that *ἀρετή* *qua* moral, or on its psychical side, is identical with the narrower term *δικαιοσύνη*. So the 'just' man is the morally good man, who "walks before God with a perfect heart" and "fulfills all righteousness,"—*integer vitae scelerisque purus*.

4. *The Good for Man, and Its Metaphysical Basis.* The child works and behaves himself in order to win a prize; and "the child is father of the man,"—of the man in the



street, that is, and of the sophist who acts sponsor for him. They regard virtue as no more than a means to some desirable end external to itself,—an unprofitable servant. Plato on the contrary sees that means and end must be connected by a closer bond, and looks to the natural and logical results of virtue as supplying in themselves the desired end, because containing in themselves intrinsic value. As a concise statement of his general view it would be difficult to improve on the account given by Professor Sidgwick:<sup>3</sup>

Since all rational activity is for some end, the different arts or functions into which human industry is divided are naturally defined by a statement of their ends or uses; and similarly, in giving an account of the different artists and functionaries, we necessarily state their end, 'what they are good for.' It is only in so far as they realize this end that they are what we call them. . . . It is easy to extend this view throughout the whole region of organized life; an eye that does not attain its end by seeing is without the essence of an eye. In short, we may say of all organs and instruments that they are what we think them in proportion as they fulfill their function and attain their end: if, then, we conceive the whole universe organically, as a complex arrangement of means to ends, we shall understand how Plato might hold that all things really *were*, or (as we say) 'realized their idea,' in proportion as they accomplished the special end or good for which they were adapted. But this special end, again, can only be really good so far as it is related to the ultimate end or good of the whole, as one of the means or particulars by or in which this is partially realized. If, then, the essence or reality of each part of the organized world is to be found in its particular end or good, the ultimate ground of all reality must be found in the ultimate end or good of the universe.

Thus Plato "identified the ultimate notions of ethics and ontology," and assumed in consequence that we cannot define the good for man unless we have a knowledge of the Good as Idea. Hence the only competent ethicist is the philosopher, and the guardians to qualify for rule in morals must study dialectic: knowledge is still, as with Socrates, the ruling factor in morals.

It thus appears that virtue is practically identical with the good for man, since the good is the end, and the end is

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<sup>3</sup> "History of Ethics," p. 38.

'realization of the idea,' and such realization consists in the fulfillment of specific function. And this is precisely what virtue, construed as Justice, secures. But although it is true in the abstract that virtue alone is all-sufficient, it may still be argued that the good for man ought to contain some other elements; and pleasure especially is a clamorous claimant for admission into the desirable life. In the *Philebus* this question is argued out at length, and it is finally decided that neither reason alone nor pleasure alone is identical with the good for man, which is a complex whole, a mixture, of which the most important ingredients are Order and Measure and Reason. As to pleasure, only the purest kinds of it can be admitted, *viz.*, certain æsthetic pleasures and intellectual pleasures. Thus the practical result of the argument is that the Good Life is the virtuous life (the 'measure' and 'symmetry' of the *Philebus* representing the principle of 'justice' in the *Republic*), which is mainly composed of intellectual studies and rational action, and to which certain 'true' and painless pleasures naturally attach. This result is of the nature of a compromise between the extreme hedonism of the Cyrenaics and the anti-hedonism or rigid intellectualism of the Cynic and Megaric schools; and it is a result accordant with the doctrine of the *Republic*, in so far as that dialogue implies that real value does belong to certain forms of pleasure, and that 'the just life' is richer in such real pleasures than 'the unjust life.' Practical common sense may wring thus much of concession from the niggardly hand of metaphysic; but it still remains true that the ruling conception of Good in the man and in the state is simply the Idea of Good particularized and realized,—Good as the principle of order, intelligibility, reality.

5. *The Personal Ideal.* As an educational implement a bare theory of morals is sadly ineffective. Men require a living example, they need to see Goodness moving and speaking before their eyes, before they will believe and be saved. It is the Founder of Christianity, rather than

the system, who "draws all men after him;" nor was it in blindness that the Cynics, for the edification of their disciples, whitewashed Heracles into a saint. In Socrates Plato found his moral type, his personal ideal, ready made. For the Platonic Socrates,—how far an idealized figure we dare not say,—is not only a preacher of virtue, he is also virtue personified. As the philosopher he is, in the first place, the lover and winner of wisdom, the primary virtue. But he is also the exemplar of courage and of temperance or self-control, the perfect master of his passions, in whom is actualized the supremacy of reason. Nowhere is this brought out more fully and vividly than in the *Symposium*,—a dialogue which, if only on this account, that it emphasizes so strongly the figure of Socrates as the personal ideal, deserves more attention than it has generally received.<sup>4</sup> From it, taken in conjunction with the *Phædo*, we learn how, in Plato's view, the righteous man, built 'four square' of virtues, conducts himself alike in the midst of life and in the face of death. The Socrates who argues in defense of morals is himself more eloquent than any argument: the compelling presence of that Silenus shape with its hidden heart of gold can draw tears of penitence from even the most hardened of 'the children of this world,' such as Alcibiades.

In his presentation of Socrates as the moral type Plato varies the tone and emphasis from dialogue to dialogue. It is the ascetic and other-worldly character which is most prominent in the *Phædo*; the philosopher prays that he may be 'saved out of the world'; he regards almost with abhorrence his material 'tomb-body' (*σῶμα σῆμα*), 'the body of this death'; and in his eyes the practice of philosophy appears to be little else than a 'cathartic' process in which the soul is purified from the defilements of the flesh, "continually mortifying all its evil and corrupt affections." But this negative aspect of philosophy, in which it appears as 'a rehearsal of death,' has for its

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<sup>4</sup> See my ed. of the *Symp.*, pp. xiv, lxi, lxxv.

complement a positive side. The 'theoretic' life is in itself a life well worth living, and the man who loses his life for its sake does not truly find it; to be 'mortified' in this sense is to have achieved the freedom which truth bestows, a harmony unbroken by carnal discords, and a god-like-ness which is the veritable *eudaemonia*. Moreover, the philosopher,—who is at once 'the mortified man,' and the seer of life *sub specie æternitatis*, through his vision of Ideal Good,—is in duty bound to use his virtue and knowledge in the service of society. For himself the theoretic life is all-sufficient, but "no man liveth to himself" but rather to the *polis* and the cosmos of which he is a member; so that it behooves the philosopher to return from his specular mount of vision to 'the cave' of the darkness of this world, there to engage in the work of turning from darkness to light the prisoners of ignorance. In short, theory must be combined with praxis; the dialectician must turn educationist: the man who is 'converted' must 'strengthen the brethren.'

And this is precisely what the Platonic Socrates does. Morals with him is Art no less than Science: his whole energy is devoted to realizing upon earth amongst his fellows the type of virtue 'laid up in the heavens,' 'the pattern showed him in the mount.' By example even more than by precept he exhibits 'the beauty of holiness,' making actual once for all in the sphere of history the personal ideal as conceived by Plato.

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## ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISON SCIENCE.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON.

I. The existence of a multitude of anti-social persons in a nation affects morality and character in varied ways. By physical inheritance from persons whose lives have